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This feature addresses the history of economic terms and ideas. The hope is to deepen the 
workaday dialogue of economists, while perhaps also casting new light on ongoing questions. 
If you have suggestions for future topics or authors, please contact Joseph Persky, Professor of 
Economics, University of Illinois, Chicago, at jpersky@uic.edu.
Introduction
Garrett Hardin’s (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons” has been incredibly 
influential in biology, ecology, and various social sciences, including economics. It 
has become a totemic reference to which tributes are regularly paid (for examples, 
see Feeny et al. 1990; Bajema 1991; Burger and Gochfeld 1998; Boyd et al. 2018). 
But “tragedy of the commons” has been transmuted into little more than a useful 
catchphrase, as if it were synonymous with free-rider problems endemic to public or 
collective goods. This obfuscates the usefulness of the concept of how a commons 
can function for the governance of shared resources. In this essay, we revisit Hardin’s 
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article 50 years after it was written to clarify, set the record straight, and explore its 
relevance in the twenty-first century.
We first remind readers that Hardin drew on both biological and economic 
theories of how competition worked and that he stressed the pressure that popula-
tion growth would place on environmental resources. His narrative was very much in 
the public eye. After all, Paul Ehrlich’s book The Population Bomb was a best seller in 
1968. We describe Hardin’s famous allegory of how sheepherders are likely to over-
exploit a commons, which had a significant impact on how subsequent generations 
understood the phenomenon. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, few economists engaged 
with Hardin’s paper in the decade following its publication. To our knowledge, no 
economists paid much attention to the biological or economic arguments behind 
Hardin’s essay, nor to his argument that the tragedy of the commons required 
government-imposed limits on births. It took some time before the tragedy of the 
commons spread among economists, and then it was typically as a quick mention in 
the background of a discussion of providing public goods.
However, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom were more insightful. In particular, 
Elinor Ostrom dedicated much of her career to demonstrating how commons 
in the real world had not led and do not inevitably lead to tragic ruin, as Hardin 
had insisted. In 2009, she received the Nobel Prize in Economics because she 
“challenged the conventional wisdom by demonstrating how local property can be 
successfully managed by local commons without any regulation by central authori-
ties or privatization.”1 In retrospect, and in the context of the work by Elinor and 
Vincent Ostrom, we can see that Hardin’s famous sheepherder allegory failed to 
make two key conceptual distinctions: the allegory conflated the idea of a scarce 
resource with the governance of that resource, and it further conflated open access 
with commons, despite significant differences in those forms of governance. We 
will clarify these distinctions and thus explore the limitations of Hardin’s view. 
Unfortunately, Hardin’s distorted perspective on the commons often persists to 
this day in economic discussions. Thus, we discuss some applications and exten-
sions of research on commons, including infrastructure, knowledge, and other 
issues. Interdisciplinary scholars have identified an expanding set of shared 
resources for which commons governance may effectively address social dilemmas.
Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”
Garrett Hardin (1915–2003) is well known in biology for his work on evolution 
and natural selection. He spent most of his career at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara, where he arrived in 1946 and stayed until his retirement in 1978. 
Hardin was also prominent as a public intellectual. He contributed to magazines, 
gave popular lectures, appeared on television and radio, and testified before many 
1 For background material on Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize, see https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
economic-sciences/2009/ostrom/facts.
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congressional committees. In both his academic and nonacademic work, Hardin 
emphasized the need to control population growth. His “Tragedy of the Commons” 
essay is his most famous attempt to make his case, but it was neither the first nor the 
last attempt (as emphasized by Oakes 2016). A prominent early effort along these 
lines, “The Competitive Exclusion Principle,” appeared in Science magazine in 1960. 
In that article, Hardin (1960, 1292, emphasis in original) stated that “complete compe-
tition cannot coexist,” explaining:
(i) [I]f two noninterbreeding populations “do the same thing”—that is, 
occupy precisely the same ecological niche in Elton’s sense—and (ii) if they 
are “sympatric”—that is, if they occupy the same geographic territory—and 
(iii) if population A multiplies even the least bit faster than population B, then 
ultimately A will completely displace B, which will become extinct.
Anticipating Michael Ghiselin’s (1974) bioeconomics and Edward O. Wilson’s 
(1975) sociobiology, Hardin combined, extrapolated, and generalized a result that 
he had found in biology and economics. In 1960, Hardin first anchored his compet-
itive exclusion principle, also known as Gause’s principle. Specifically, Russian 
evolutionist Georgii Gause (1932) had shown in a series of experiments involving 
yeast and paramecia that when different species live in a shared environment and 
use similar resources, one species will tend to drive out the others. Hardin (1960, 
1293) acknowledged the principle was hard to “prove or disprove” empirically, but 
further argued that “[t]he ‘truth’ of the principle is and can be established only by 
theory.”
Second, Hardin (1960, 1295) thought it was “possible” that principle “origi-
nated in economic thought.” Thus, as another source of inspiration for the claim 
that competition would destroy itself, he cited “the French mathematician” Joseph 
Bertrand. Commenting on Cournot’s duopoly model, Bertrand (as quoted in 
Hardin 1960, 1295–96) noted that if
one of the competitors will lower his price in order to attract the buyers 
to himself, and that the other, trying to regain them, will set his price still 
lower . . . there is no limit to the lowering of the price. Whatever common price 
might be initially adopted, if one of the competitors were to lower the price 
unilaterally he would thereby attract the totality of the business to himself.
Hardin (1960, 1296) thus stated baldly: “Any competitor knows that unrestrained 
competition will ultimately result in but one victor,” in part because unrestricted 
companies will form cartels or use intellectual property to block competitors. In 
international trade, Hardin argued, his proposed competition exclusion principles 
meant that the world would need to reconsider tariffs and trade barriers, to prevent 
one country from being the victor that drives all others from the market.
Of course, just as many biologists of the time were engaged in controversy over 
the actual reach of the competitive exclusion principle, many economists then and 
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now would take issue with the claim that all competition tends to monopoly. Even 
at the time, Gordon Tullock (1960, 95) stressed that Hardin’s article “contains an 
error in economics. From the principle that complete competitors cannot coexist 
he deduces the development of monopolies.” Tullock argued: “If the principle has 
any application to economics at all, it would indicate that one type of economic 
enterprise might, by multiplication of its members, replace another, but this would 
not lead to monopoly.”
In Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” essay, instead of focusing on biolog-
ical competitors with a fixed set of resources and similar needs, he added another 
dimension: the stress that population growth inevitably placed on environmental 
resources—“the world available to the terrestrial population is finite” (Hardin 
1968, 1243). That was also the case with other natural resources, such as oceans, 
which people tend to think as “inexhaustible” (1245); national parks, about which 
he remarked “there is only one Yosemite Valley” (1245); air and rivers; and even 
“airwaves of radio and television” (1249). Scarcity was the origin of the economic, 
ecological, and social problem.
In what is probably the most-quoted portion of the essay (at least in classes in 
economics!), Hardin (1968, 1244) proposed a sheepherder allegory to understand 
the basic motivation at work:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try 
to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. . . .
 As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly 
or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of add-
ing one more animal to my herd?” This utility has one negative and one posi-
tive component.
 1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. 
Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional 
animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
 2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing 
created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are 
shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-
making herdsman is only a fraction of −1.
 Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another; and another.  .  .  . But this is the conclusion 
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is 
the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes 
in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
In Hardin’s (1968, 1245) view, individuals acted vis-à-vis the world and its 
resources as if they were “independent, rational, free-enterprisers,” as if their action 
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had no impact on them, as if Adam Smith’s invisible hand had actually worked 
and “decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire 
society” (1244). Rationally, such behavior was perfectly understandable: “Each 
man,” explained Hardin, “is locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit” (1244) or “a system of ‘fouling our own nest’” (1245). The 
consequence was unavoidable. Because of the ongoing increase in population and 
humanity’s shared use of the global commons, “the per capita share of the world’s 
goods must steadily decrease” (1243), which would generate “misery” (1243) and 
“ruin” (1244).
At its core, Hardin’s (1968) tragedy, captured in his sheepherder analogy, illus-
trates a rather standard economics problem of interdependence, which involves issues 
of collective goods or external effects. After early analyses by Pigou (1920) and Knight 
(1924), these problems had received more attention and had been more frequently 
discussed in the mid- to late 1950s with the works of Samuelson (1954), Bator (1958), 
and Coase (1960) (for an overview, see Marciano and Medema 2015). Hardin offered 
quick and casual references to Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, but he did not refer 
to any of the modern economists who had contributed to the study of how to deal with 
situations involving interdependence. Hardin also neglected prior work in economics 
that dealt with commons (for example, Gordon 1954 on fisheries).
Indeed, Hardin’s (1968) sheepherder allegory strikingly echoed the view Samu-
elson advanced in 1954: namely, that the economic problem of inefficient resource 
allocation does not come from the interdependence of resources but rather from 
the tendency of self-interested individuals to engage in free riding—the “hope to 
snatch some selfish benefit,” in Samuelson’s (1954, 389) words. For Hardin, the 
problem resided more in the freedom to use a resource rather than in the character-
istics of the resource itself; significantly, he titled one of the sections of his article 
“Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons” (Hardin 1968, 1244).
To avoid the tragedy, Hardin argued for governance to constrain consumption 
and ensure sustainability. His advice was simple: stop making resources open to all. 
He pointed out that this step had already been taken with “food gathering, enclosing 
farm land and restricting pastures and hunting and fishing areas” (Hardin 1968, 
1248). It should also be done, in Hardin’s view, with “commons as a place for waste 
disposal” and with “pollution by automobiles, factories, insecticide sprayers, fertil-
izing operations, and atomic energy installations,” as well as with “the commons in 
matters of pleasure,” restricting, for instance, “the propagation of sound waves . . . in 
the public medium”—what he called “mindless music.” All this would imply coer-
cion, “the infringements on somebody’s personal liberty.” But in Hardin’s view, it 
was the illusion and appearance of freedom associated with the philosophy of open 
access to resources that was actually coercive: “Individuals locked into the logic of 
the commons are free only to bring on universal ruin.” 
Hardin’s (1968) primary focus and attack in his “Tragedy of the Commons” 
essay was on rising human populations: indeed, the subtitle of the article is “The 
Population Problem Has No Technical Solution; It Requires a Fundamental 
Extension in Morality.” Hardin (1968, 1246) argued that the “freedom to breed” is 
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“intolerable.” He rejected appeals to conscience: “[A]n appeal to independently 
acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, 
and an increase in anxiety in the short” (1248). He insisted upon mutual coercion 
as the approach: “Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not 
forever be so” (1247). He referred to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which held that all choices about the size of families should 
be made by families. Hardin responded: “It is painful to have to deny categori-
cally the validity of this right; denying it, one feels as uncomfortable as a resident 
of Salem, Massachusetts, who denied the reality of witches in the 17th century” 
(1246).2
Hardin (1968) recognized two solutions to the tragedy of the commons: govern-
ment regulation and privatization. Both solutions rely on collective action through 
government to introduce constraints on resource consumption. The approaches 
differ substantially in terms of the manner in which ongoing (month-to-month, 
day-to-day, minute-to-minute) resource allocation decisions are made. Government 
can constrain consumption by directly managing or regulating resource use. Alter-
natively, government can establish a system of private property rights delineating 
ownership of the resources. The former presumes government will consider the 
aggregate effects and manage resource use efficiently over time, and the latter 
presumes well-defined private property rights will facilitate market exchanges and 
thereby lead to an efficient allocation of access and use rights and, consequently, effi-
cient resource management over time. In the case of population growth, Hardin’s 
essay does not explicitly contemplate a privatization approach (like a transferable 
right for any adult to be the biological parent to one child). Government regulation 
of population is necessary, Hardin (1968, 1248) claimed: “Freedom to breed will 
bring ruin to all.” 
Early Interpretation and Incorporation within Economics
Hardin’s (1968) article attracted a reasonable degree of public attention, but 
most economists did not much refer to Hardin. The few who did argued that Hardin 
was cited for having coined an interesting expression for what economists already 
knew. For example, in one of the first references made by an economist to Hardin, 
Dales (1975, 495) explained that because of the difficulties in assigning property 
rights, “the expected outcome followed—overuse, congestion, premature deple-
tion, or extinction, depending on the particular characteristics of the case—and 
2 As Bajema (1991) notes, Hardin was often willing to “break social taboos.” Along with calling for 
government-mandated population control, he signed with 51 others a Wall Street Journal op-ed called 
“Mainstream Science on Intelligence,” written by Linda Gottfredson ([1994] 1997), that discussed 
average racial-ethnic differences in intelligence measured in terms of IQ. Another striking example is his 
1974 essay, “Living in a Lifeboat,” in which he again insisted on the need to control population growth 
and asserted that the problem of “Christian-Marxist” idealism is that “the sharing ethics . . . leads to the 
tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1974, 562).
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the value of the resource dropped toward zero. ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ to 
use Hardin’s apt phrase, unfolded inexorably.” Along the same lines, a few years 
later, one read that “[w]ithout private property, society will experience the ‘tragedy 
of the commons’—ownership by all actually means ownership by none” (Carroll, 
Ciscil, and Chisholm 1979, 607). At the beginning of the 1980s, a few economists 
discussed again the problem of fisheries, with a similar tone. For instance, Johnson 
and Libecap (1982) referred to a series of articles on fisheries as common-property 
resources, and they mentioned Hardin’s 1968 article only in passing, as if it were a 
necessary reference.3
But over time, the “Tragedy of the Commons” article became one among many 
that formed “the large literature” devoted to “common-property management” 
(Thiesenhusen 1991, 18). In the economics literature, it was no longer distinguished 
from the articles written by economists themselves, and Hardin was put on the same 
footing as the economists who had worked on property rights. He was thus cited as a 
scholar defending a neoclassical “perspective” (Carroll, Ciscil, and Chisholm 1979) 
or “paradigm” (Swaney 1981) and lumped together with Coase (1960) and Demsetz 
(1967), despite their very different perspectives and approaches. The context of 
Hardin’s (1968) work, with its focus on overpopulation and advocacy of mandatory 
government control over population growth, largely faded away.
The Ostroms
Elinor and Vincent Ostrom noted as early as 1971 that “Garrett Hardin had 
indicated that these strategies [such as free riding] give rise to ‘the tragedy of the 
commons’ where increased individual effort leaves everyone worse off” (V. Ostrom 
and E. Ostrom 1971, 207). In 1973, Vincent Ostrom referred to Hardin and 
described the tragedy as follows (V. Ostrom 1973, 210–11):
Individualistic decision making applied to common-property resources will 
inexorably result in tragedy unless the structure of decision-making arrange-
ments can be modified to enable persons to act jointly in relation to those 
resources as a common property. Potential recourse to coercive measures 
will also be necessary to preclude a hold-out strategy and regulate patterns of 
use among all users. Unrestricted individualistic decision-making in relation 
to common-property resources or public goods will lead to the competitive 
dynamic of a negative-sum game: the greater the individual effort, the worse 
off people become.
3 One set of writers even supposed that Hardin had “documented more fully” the problem of overexploi-
tation (Balachandran, Fisher, and Stanley 1989, 261), which is obviously an exaggeration: Hardin had 
given no more than a few examples. Furthermore, despite Hardin’s depiction, commons existed and 
were successfully managed in various ways in medieval England and many other parts of the world for a 
very long time (Dahlman 1980; Buck Cox 1985; Bannon 2017).
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These references were not different from those of most economists at that time. But 
the Ostroms, and especially Elinor, disagreed with Hardin. In an interview with Levi 
(2010), she recounted that the first time she heard Hardin she “was somewhat taken 
aback” because her and Vincent’s work proved Hardin was wrong.4
Elinor Ostrom and other social scientists challenged the frame set by Hardin 
by asking two foundational sets of questions: First, how well does the tragedy of the 
commons allegory describe reality? Is it a useful theory for making predictions about 
real-world behavior of individuals sharing common-pool resources? Does it describe 
a normal or exceptional situation? Does it provide a useful basis for choosing or 
designing regulatory solutions? Second, does the binary choice between govern-
ment command-and-control regulation and private property–enabled markets 
reflect the full range of options? Are there alternative (bottom-up) institutions 
and/or means for collective action (Frischmann 2013, 390)?
To answer the first set of questions, it may be convenient to work within the 
confines of Hardin’s sheepherder allegory, because doing so makes analysis trac-
table. As Elinor Ostrom explained (E. Ostrom 2007, 15183):
Situations characterized by [Hardin’s] assumptions, in which individuals inde-
pendently make anonymous decisions and primarily focus on their own imme-
diate payoffs, do tend to overharvest open-access resources. Researchers have 
repeatedly generated a “tragedy of the commons” in experimental laborato-
ries when subjects make independent and anonymous decisions in a common-
pool resource setting.
The allegory, however, is reductionist and distorting. It includes a series of assump-
tions with respect to both resources and resource management that severely limits 
its generalizability. Simply put, Hardin’s description of the tragedy of the commons 
ruled out—by assumption—the possibility that people might communicate and 
find ways to cooperate. Again, as Elinor Ostrom explained (E. Ostrom 2007, 15183):
Making one small change  .  .  .  in the structure of laboratory experiments, a 
change that is predicted by game theory to make no difference in the pre-
dicted outcome, has repeatedly had major impacts on interactions and out-
comes. Simply enabling subjects to engage in face-to-face communication 
between decision rounds enables them to approach socially optimal harvest-
ing levels rather than severely overharvesting the commons. In the  face-to-face 
discussions, participants tend to discuss what they all should do and build 
norms to encourage conformance.
Elinor Ostrom also criticized reliance on the rational actor model at the heart of 
Hardin’s allegory when analyzing collective action and social dilemmas (E. Ostrom 
4 For more details on Elinor Ostrom’s framework, useful starting points are Aligica and Boettke (2009) 
and Tarko (2017).
Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years     219
2000). After establishing a series of “well-substantiated facts” about human behavior 
based on extensive fieldwork, she concluded: “I believe that one is forced by these 
well-substantiated facts to adopt a more eclectic (and classical) view of human 
behavior” (E. Ostrom 2000, 141). She then developed a “second-generation model 
of rationality” in which humans are “complex, fallible learners who seek to do as 
well as they can given the constraints that they face and who are able to learn heuris-
tics, norms, rules, and how to craft rules to improve achieved outcomes” (E. Ostrom 
1998, 9). The second-generation model of rationality predicts that reciprocity, repu-
tation, and trust as “core relationships” can lead to increased net benefits (13). This 
theoretical model identifies “individual attributes” that are particularly important 
in explaining behavior in social dilemmas. These attributes include “[1] the expec-
tations individuals have about others’ behavior (trust), [2] the norms individuals 
learn from socialization and life’s experiences (reciprocity), and [3] the identities 
individuals create that project their intentions and norms (reputation)” (14).
Thus, Elinor Ostrom (1990) rebelled against the distorting reductionism that 
Hardin’s essay represented—and Hardin was hardly the only culprit. Donning the 
analytical straitjacket would “lead the analyst to miss what is most important and 
focus on what is least relevant” (Frischmann 2013, 390). This was especially true 
when approaching the second set of questions and the feasibility of institutional 
solutions besides private property–enabled markets and government command-
and-control regulation. Commons governance was ignored as a solution because it 
was presumed to be the problem that inevitably leads to ruin. 
To explore alternative institutional arrangements, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, 
and their colleagues both at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Anal-
ysis at Indiana University and around the world, advocated “to combine formal 
approaches, fieldwork and experiments in order to ‘penetrate’ social reality rather 
than to use formal techniques to ‘distance’ ourselves from it” (V. Ostrom, quoted in 
Aligica 2009, 5). Thus, in the three decades that followed publication of Hardin’s 
“Tragedy,” they engaged in rigorous, interdisciplinary social science to diagnose 
social dilemmas and to understand the commons as a mode of governing access to 
and use of shared resources. This approach stressed context and was grounded in 
empirical study. Systematic studies of real communities demonstrated that commons 
governance works in some contexts and fails in others (E. Ostrom 1990, 2005). 
Communities may develop their own governance institutions, but communities are 
still embedded in government and market systems. Recognizing that governance 
institutions vary across communities and contexts, Elinor Ostrom and colleagues 
developed a framework illustrated in Figure 1—the Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment (IAD) framework (for explanation, useful starting points are Kiser and 
Ostrom 1982; E. Ostrom 1986, 1994)—that could be used to analyze institutional 
arrangements and capture their diversity.5 To quote Elinor Ostrom, “[t]he IAD 
5 The Social Ecological Systems and Governing Knowledge Commons frameworks build upon the IAD 
framework (E. Ostrom 2007; Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg 2014). All three frameworks enable 
systematic institutional analysis.
220     Journal of Economic Perspectives
framework is designed to enable scholars to analyze systems that are composed of a 
cluster of variables, each of which can then be unpacked multiple times depending 
on the question of immediate interest” (E. Ostrom 2010, 646).
Because these clusters of variables are interrelated, researchers can start at the 
left with the external variables, at the center with the action arena, or at the right 
with the outcomes. The external variables affect actors and action situations, which 
“generate patterns of interactions and outcomes that are evaluated by participants 
in the action situation (and potentially by scholars) and feed back on both the 
external variables and the action situations” and the actors (E. Ostrom 2010, 647). 
The many detailed examples using the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework are beyond the scope of this paper. As one brief example, consider a 
lobster fishery. The tragedy of the commons allegory makes assumptions about the 
biophysical characteristics (depletable), community (independent, self-interested 
rational actors), and rules-in-use (every fisherman for himself); also, it assumes the 
only actors are the fishermen and the only relevant collective action problem is 
the prediction of ruinous competition. Viewed through the IAD lens, the empirical 
shortcomings of Hardin’s allegory become clear: lobsters are not purely deplet-
able; as a biological matter, they can reproduce and replenish stocks. The relevant 
community involves more than just the fishermen. Communication and coopera-
tion are feasible. The rules-in-use are more nuanced than everyone for himself (for 
detailed examination, see Acheson 2003).
Recognizing that people often can cooperate effectively and build institu-
tions to enable sustainable use of shared resources focused scholarly attention on 
complexity, context, communities, and institutions. This broader field of vision 
brought informal institutions into view and encouraged their systematic study, and it 
also improved our understanding of formal institutions by revealing the many ways 
that government, market, and community institutions depend on one another to be 
successful. Figuring out how best to successfully cooperate in governing ourselves 
Figure 1 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework
Source: Adapted from Hess and Ostrom (2007, 44).
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and our shared environments remains one of the core questions studied in law, 
economics, political science, sociology, and many other related fields today.
Two Key Conceptual Mistakes That Further Muddle Hardin’s Special 
Case
As the work of Elinor Ostrom and many others makes clear, the assumptions 
made in Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons” article, highlighted by the 
sheepherder allegory, limit his analysis to a special case. In this section, we go 
one step further, explaining why Hardin made two basic conceptual mistakes that 
further distort the usefulness of his case.
First, Hardin confused resources with governance. In his sheepherding allegory, 
for example, the relevant resource is a pasture, and the relevant governance is open-
access sharing: as the allegory begins, “Picture a pasture open to all.” To describe 
commons as the resource subject to tragedy is a category error. Commons are not, and 
should not be conflated with, resources. They are neither common-pool resources nor 
public goods; these types of sharable goods may, however, be governed as or within 
commons. Instead, commons are a form of resource governance where members of a 
community share resources on terms set by the community. Thus, commons “applies 
to resources, and involves a group or community of people, but commons does not 
denote the resources, the community, a place, or a thing. Commons [are] the institu-
tional arrangement of these elements” (Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg 2014, 
2). Unfortunately, many people describe a commons a shared resource subject to 
tragedy. This perpetuates Hardin’s conceptual mistake.
Second, Hardin conflated two different governance systems. He used the term 
“commons,” but he limited his analysis to the consequences of only one mode of 
governance, open-access sharing. Yet these are quite different, and the differences 
matter (Frischmann 2012, 8). Open access implies no ownership or property rights. 
No individual or institution has the right to exclude others from the resource. 
Hence, all who want access can get access, typically for free. By comparison, commons 
involve some form of communal ownership (community property rights, public 
property rights, joint ownership rights). As a consequence, access to the resource 
is restricted to the members of the relevant community, under more or less restric-
tive conditions, and nonmembers can be excluded. In other words, open access 
differs from commons in several ways: in terms of ownership (none versus communal/
group), definition of community (public at large versus a more narrowly defined and 
circumscribed group with some boundary between members and nonmembers), 
and degree of exclusion (none versus exclusion of nonmembers).
These distinctions are important for understanding different institutions 
and how social arrangements operate at different scales. By making the assump-
tions that he did, Hardin (1968) locked himself into the analysis of a special case 
and significantly underestimated the power of commons as an efficient form of 
governance.
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Extensions: Infrastructure and Knowledge
The tragic dilemma at the core of Hardin’s allegory has been identified and 
discussed for a wide range of different resources. Much of the early work focused on 
natural resources like fisheries and other typically common-pool resources. It has 
also received renewed attention in immigration debates (for example, Normadin 
and Valles 2015). But not surprisingly, the dilemma arises with many human-made 
resources too. Some are common-pool resources subject to congestion and poten-
tial deterioration like roads and other infrastructure, while others are public goods 
subject to free-rider concerns like ideas and other knowledge resources. In these 
settings, there can also be an inclination toward a Hardin-style bias to believe that 
the relevant collective action problems (1) can be diagnosed in terms of ruinous 
competition and (2) can be addressed only by direct government mandates and/or 
government-enforced property rights. Such bias leads analysts to undervalue the 
usefulness and workability of commons governance over these resources by the 
relevant community. Here, we offer a brief and selective discussion of these topics, 
with an emphasis on how interdisciplinary research in these areas is moving past the 
basic tragedy of the commons model.
Infrastructure Commons
Infrastructure resources are often managed in an openly accessible manner 
that gives rise to possibilities that economists have likened to Hardin’s tragedy of the 
commons.6 For example, individual users rationally use toll-free highways at a rate 
and in a manner that maximizes private gains but disregards the effects on other 
users or, more generally, the sustainability of the resource. If each individual acts in 
such a fashion, aggregate consumption may lead to congestion costs from crowding, 
increased waiting time in queues, slower service, pollution, noise, reduced quality of 
service due to increased interruptions of service, and accelerated depreciation and 
depletion of the shared infrastructure (Frischmann 2012).
The basic economic model of congestion, like Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of 
the commons, assumes homogeneous uses (Vickrey 1969; Arnott, de Palma, and 
Lindsey 1993). The shared meadow is used for grazing sheep (not for grazing other 
animals or for other activities); the shared highway is used to complete trips (in 
more or less identical vehicles). When considering homogeneous use, economists 
utilize a congestion cost function that relates the marginal social cost of resource use 
(like feeding sheep or completing a trip) to utilization rates (traffic) and resource 
capacity (like acreage or number of lanes). Such congestion is called “anonymous 
crowding,” because the determinants of crowding are utilization and facility size, 
and attributes of individual users play no part in the equation (Cornes and Sandler 
1996, 355). However, complications arise as heterogeneous users and uses are incor-
porated into economic models (Cornes and Sandler 1996): for example, variance 
6 Unlike Hardin’s pasture, most infrastructure resources are human-made, and that gives rise to a host of 
supply-side issues, which we leave aside for the sake of brevity.
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in capacity consumption rates and cross-crowding between uses. To illustrate cross-
crowding, Frischmann (2012) extends Hardin’s sheepherder allegory to include 
different livestock, assuming sheep, donkeys, and buffalo graze differently and also 
positing that “sheep and buffalo . . . fight each other.” For roadways, a similar exten-
sion might involve cars, mass-transit buses, and trucks.
Heterogeneity affects the analysis of costs and benefits and is relevant to diag-
nosing congestion problems and comparing solutions. When crowding is no longer 
anonymous, discriminating among uses becomes a regulatory option to consider. 
In addition, a standard response of modern economists to congestion would be to 
use some form of congestion pricing to encourage users with heterogenous values 
of traveling by car at certain times to sort themselves—a policy choice that goes 
unconsidered in Hardin (1968).
There is also a case that certain infrastructural resources ought to be managed 
openly, because doing so may generate public goods and positive externalities 
or positive scale returns—greater social value with greater use of the resource 
(Frischmann 2012; Frischmann and Hogendorn 2015). Rose (1986) called this the 
“comedy of the commons.” Rose (1986, 769–70) used road systems to illustrate and 
explained how commerce enabled by roads is an
interactive practice whose exponential returns to increasing participation run 
on without limit. . . . Through ever-expanding commerce, the nation becomes 
ever-wealthier, and hence trade and commerce routes must be held open to the 
public, even if contrary to private interest. Instead of worrying that too many 
people will engage in commerce, we worry that too few will undertake the effort.
Commerce generates private value that is captured by participants in economic 
transactions, as buyers and sellers exchange goods and services, but it also gener-
ates social value that is not easily observed and captured by participants. Examples 
include the value associated with traveling to visit friends and relatives or traveling 
for recreation, as well as the value of widespread attendance at civic events— 
knowledge exchange, socialization, and acculturation. If open travel creates positive 
externalities, society may find diverse ways to take this into account as it considers 
how to manage access to roads. Frischmann (2012) extends the point to a variety of 
other infrastructural resources, ranging from basic research to the internet.
The Public Domain and Knowledge Commons
The connection from intellectual property to the tragedy of the commons has 
been made explicit by a number of writers. Carrol, Ciscil, and Chisholm (1979, 611) 
appear the first to refer to copyright law as a means for dealing with the tragedy 
that seems to also plague intellectual commons. Yet ideas are public goods, not 
common-pool resources. Thus, using and overusing ideas (or works of art) may, 
in special cases, reduce their value (Landes and Posner 2003, 487) but does not 
congest or deplete them. Unconstrained consumption seems good—the more, the 
merrier (Rose 1986; see also Merton 1988)—and even just (as discussed in Gosseries, 
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Marciano, and Strowel 2008) rather than bad or wrong. If an intellectual resource, 
such as an idea, is openly accessible to all, then everyone who can profitably make 
use of it will do so. But there’s a catch. Ideas are products of human intellect; they 
require investment of time, effort, and capital. Unconstrained consumption by free 
riders presents a risk for potential investors, who may struggle to recover a sufficient 
return on their investment and may underinvest as a result. Thus, tragic under-
production of intellectual resources appears to be a social dilemma that mirrors 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons. Avoiding cultural, technological, and scientific 
stagnation seems to require collective action. 
Many approaching this problem assume Hardin’s (1968) two options: direct 
government intervention (via public funding) or privatization (via intellectual 
property–enabled markets). To be clear, government funding and intellectual prop-
erty are incredibly important drivers of socially valuable knowledge production. 
However, one can make a case that much or even most of humanity’s intellectual 
resources have been generated and shared within open-access and community-based 
commons, often without government subsidy and outside of intellectual property–
mediated markets. The free-rider allegory myopically presumes tragedy, leading 
people to believe that free riding is necessarily harmful and needs to be eliminated 
(Lemley 2005). In fact, the opposite is often true. Free riding is pervasive and is 
often a beneficial feature, rather than a bug, of our economic, cultural, and social 
systems (Ramello 2011; Frischmann 2012; Lobel 2013). Since at least Schumpeter 
(1934), the creative process has been likened to a recombinant process in which 
(open) access to previously created knowledge plays a crucial role, fueling prog-
ress and driving the combinatorial process of knowledge accumulation that fosters 
economic growth. This perspective emphasizes the positive externalities character-
izing knowledge production and the role of commons governance (Weitzman 1998; 
Marchese et al. 2019), including the role of the knowledge commons and rules 
governing the public domain.
Knowledge commons refers to the institutionalized community governance 
of the sharing and, in many cases, creation and curation of a wide range of intel-
lectual and cultural resources (Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg 2014). 
Examples include the scientific research commons, including data, literature, 
and research materials (Reichman, Uhlir, and Dedeurwaerdere 2016); intellec-
tual property pools (Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg 2010); open-source 
computer software projects (Schweik and English 2012); Wikipedia (Hoffman 
and Mehra 2009; Safner 2016); “jamband” fan communities (Schultz 2006); and 
highly specialized technical knowledge like the Cornish steam engine (Nuvolari 
2004). Using the Ostrom-inspired Governing Knowledge Commons framework, 
case studies examine many governance issues, including interactions with intel-
lectual property, government subsidies, and regulation (Frischmann, Madison, 
and Strandburg 2014; Strandburg, Frischmann, and Madison 2017; Sanfilippo, 
Frischmann, and Strandburg forthcoming). For example, rare disease research 
consortia must address numerous governance challenges, including allocating 
research funding, authorship credit, and other rivalrous resources; overcoming 
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potential “anticommons”7 dilemmas arising from researchers’ incentives to hoard 
access to patients and their data; maintaining privacy, security, and the trust of 
patients and their families; reducing transaction costs of cooperation between 
widely dispersed researchers; and managing interactions with outsiders, such as 
pharmaceutical companies.
Other researchers have focused on the governance of the public domain, which 
is the incredibly capacious set of ideas, facts, and many other intellectual resources 
that are openly accessible by default to everyone (Litman 1990; see also Posner 
2005). As an example of work in this area, a rich legal literature explores categories 
related to public domain, such as the semi-commons constructed within intellectual 
property systems and the creative commons constructed with intellectual property 
licenses (for a detailed survey, see Benkler 2014).
Social demand for trusted governance of shared knowledge resources, ranging 
from medical data to algorithmically generated intelligence, is growing (Frischmann 
and Selinger 2018), even as public trust in governments and markets as sources 
of governance seems tenuous. Now, more than ever, we need to explore whether, 
when, and how commons governance can scale.
Conclusion
Hardin’s (1968) ultimate legacy is not really about his analysis of the tragedy 
of the commons, which was relatively trivial given already available economic tools, 
nor is it about his analysis of commons, which focused only on a narrow special 
case. Hardin contributed a catchphrase that caught the prevailing winds of public 
discourse and drew attention to the governance of shared resources. In the end, 
Elinor Ostrom’s interdisciplinary, international, and systematic analysis of commons 
governance is and should be the abiding legacy of the tragedy of the commons. 
7 Michael Heller (1998) coined the term “anticommons.” He argued that too much private property could 
lead to underuse and waste of resources, with effects as tragic as the lack of property rights described 
by Hardin (1968). Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg explored the potential tragedy of the anticommons 
in biomedical research (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). Buchanan and Yoon (2000) developed a formal 
economic model of anticommons. The anticommons concept may offer a justification for fair use and 
other copyright exceptions (Depoorter and Parisi 2002; Parisi, Schulz, and Depoorter 2005).
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